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Abstract
Hawthorne et al. (2015) argue that the Principal Principle implies a version of the
Principle of Indifference. We show that what the Authors take to be the Principle
of Indifference can be obtained without invoking anything which would seem to be
related to the Principal Principle. In the Appendix we also discuss several Conditions
proposed in the same paper.
The argument of Hawthorne et al. (2015) (“Authors” from here on) that the Principal
Principle implies what they take to be the Principle of Indifference is based on their Propo-
sition 2, which (using their notation, and remembering that X “says that the chance at time
t of proposition A is x and E is any proposition that is compatible with X and admissible
at time t,” ibid. p. 1.1) can be restated as follows:
Proposition 2. Let P (A|X) = P (A|XE) = P (A|FXE) = P (A|(A ↔ F )XE). Then
from x 6= 0, x 6= 1 and from the Principal Principle P (A|X) = x it follows that
P (F |XE) = 1/2.
Unfortunately it is unclear what the essence of Proposition 2 has to do with the Principal
Principle. One can easily show that its “indifference” message is simply a consequence of
imposing a sufficient number of independence constraints on an arbitrary probability space:
Proposition 2’. Let P (A|X) = P (A|XE) = P (A|FXE) = P (A|(A ↔ F )XE). Then
from P (A|X) 6= 0, P (A|X) 6= 1 it follows that P (F |XE) = 1/2.
1We note here that the Authors require also that F be “contingent and atomic”. From their footnote 1
it is clear that by this they do not mean that F should be an atom of the considered algebra of propositions,
and rather that it should not be “logically complex”. We believe that the mathematics of the current paper,
and specifically the Counterexample in the Appendix is acceptable from that point of view.
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The proof is a straightforward calculation which does not make use of the Principal Principle.
As it can be readily seen by comparing the Authors’ Proposition 2 with Proposition 2’ the
only tenuous connection between the Authors’ Proposition 2 and the Principal Principle
comes from that in order to conclude that P (F |EX) = 1/2 one needs to rule out the
extreme cases when P (A|X) = 0 or P (A|X) = 1; Proposition 2 achieves this by setting
x 6= 0, x 6= 1 and applying the Principal Principle, but this is an overkill, since P (A|X) 6= 0,
P (A|X) 6= 1 could be directly achieved by simply requiring that learning event X does not
make A impossible or certain.
Thus the Principal Principle does not have much to do with the essence of Proposition
2. The Authors themselves also make a side-remark on p. 4. that “interestingly, [their] line
of argument does not depend on the structure of the proposition X,” but they do not follow
up on it and they do not seem to come to the realization that the indifference message of
Proposition 2 is a mere consequence of the independence constraints: their Superprincipal
principle, with which the Authors generalize the Principal Principle, also makes assumptions
about the structure of proposition X, and their generalized argument given subsequently still
relies on equating a conditional probability P (A|XE) with a number x 6= 0, x 6= 1 to reach
the conclusion. Assuming that P (A|XE) = x and x 6= 0, x 6= 1 is still an overkill to merely
ensure P (A|XE) 6= 0, P (A|XE) 6= 1, which as we can see in Proposition 2’ is all that is
needed to arrive at P (F |XE) = 1/2. And thus the Superprincipal principle does not have
much to do with the essence of Proposition 2 either.
Notice that our claim is not that it is possible to obtain the Principle of Indifference
from something weaker than the Principal Principle: this would even strengthen the original
point the Authors wanted to make! We say rather that the argument does not seem to have
any connection to the Principal Principle, since it is an inference from a set of independence
assumptions to a conclusion about independence, not relying on any statement regarding
(credences about) chances.
The Authors devote some time to “defending” their Condition 2 which is intended to
furnish one of the premises of their Proposition 2. It can be restated as follows:
Condition 2. If P (A|XE) = P (A|X), P (F ) = P (F |XE), and the Principal Principle
P (A|X) = x holds, then P (A|XE(A↔ F )) = P (A|X).
The Authors state that Condition 2 “must hold because [it] encapsulate[s] core intuitions
about defeat” (p. 4.); however, one can show with a counterexample that Condition 2 is not
a theorem of probability theory. Instead of searching for ways to “defend” Condition 2 it
might be instructive to ask what additional supposition (S) the Authors would need to add
to the premises of Condition 2 to make it a theorem. It is easy to find candidates for (S)
that express probabilistic requirements in terms of A,E, F,X (and possibly other events)
without referring to the value x; however if (S) took such form, then the same (S) could also
be added to the premises of
Condition 2’. If P (A|XE) = P (A|X), P (F ) = P (F |XE) holds, then P (A|XE(A ↔
F )) = P (A|X)
to make this latter a theorem. This is since if (S) does not refer to x, then the additional
assumption P (A|X) = x, which is what differentiates Condition 2 from Condition 2’, will
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clearly not be used in the derivation. Thus if the Authors succeed in finding and defending
such an (S) with which Condition 2 furnishes the desired premise of Proposition 2, then
with the same (S) Condition 2’ also furnishes the corresponding premise of Proposition 2’.
Since neither Condition 2’ nor Proposition 2’ invokes the Principal Principle, we again would
complete an argument for what the Authors’ interpret as the Principle of Indifference without
invoking the Principal Principle. (For the mentioned counterexample, proof of Proposition
2’, and additional comments on the Authors’ arguments regarding their Condition 1 and
Condition 2 the Reader is referred to the Appendix.)
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2’
Before the proof for later purposes we slightly reformulate Proposition 2’:
Proposition 2’. Let (LX , PX) be a probability space, A,E, F ∈ LX , and let PX(A) =
PX(A|E) = PX(A|FE) = PX(A|(A ↔ F )E). Then from PX(A) 6= 0, PX(A) 6= 1 it
follows that PX(F |E) = 1/2.
Proof. Using the following identification for the probabilities for different conjunctions:
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8
PX(.) p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8
A x x x x
E x x x x
F x x x x
(so that AEF = o8, PX(AEF ) = p8 etc.) we can restate the conditions as
p8/(p4 + p8) = p8/(p3 + p8) (1)
p8/(p4 + p8) = p5 + p6 + p7 + p8 (2)
p8/(p3 + p8) = (p7 + p8)/(p3 + p4 + p7 + p8); (3)
we also require pi ≥ 0,
∑8
i=1 pi = 1, and p3 + p4 + p7 + p8 > 0, p4 + p8 > 0, p3 + p8 > 0 for
the conditional probabilities to make sense.
By (1) we get that either p3 = p4 or p8 = 0. If p8 = 0 then from (2) PX(A) = p5 + p6 +
p7 + p8 = 0 and all other conditions can be satisfied. If p8 6= 0 then assuming p3 = p4 from
3
(3) we get that either p7 = p8 or p4 = 0. If p4 = 0 then from (2) PX(A) = p5+p6+p7+p8 = 1
and all other conditions can be satisfied. Assuming p8 6= 0, p4 6= 0 and thus that p3 = p4 and
p7 = p8, PX(F |E) = (p4 + p8)/(p3 + p4 + p7 + p8) = (p4 + p8)/(2p4 + 2p8) = 1/2 and all other
conditions can be satisfied. To sum up, either PX(A) = 0, or PX(A) = 1, or PX(F |E) = 1/2.
QED
Remarks on Conditions 1 and 2 and a counterexample
The premises of the Authors’ Proposition 2 are supposed to be furnished by the following
two Conditions:
“Condition 1. If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information that renders
F relevant to A, then EF is not a defeater.”
“Condition 2. If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information relevant to
F , then E(A↔ F ) is not a defeater.” (ibid., p. 2)
which are, as mentioned earlier, to be understood in a context where X says that the
chance at time t of proposition A is x. The Authors call E a “non-defeater” (w.r.t. A) if
P (A|XE) = P (A|X) = x holds.
Unfortunately the Authors “take the supposition that XE contains no information that
renders F relevant to A to imply that P (A|FXE) = P (A|XE)” (ibid., p. 2). In other
words, according to the Authors, if XE contains no information that renders F relevant to
A then XE screens off F from A. This is surely too strong. The most natural mathematical
counterpart of the Author’s natural language expression in Condition 1 seems to be the one
corresponding closely to “if F is not relevant to A then XE does not make it relevant”,
namely
P (A|F ) = P (A)→ P (A|FXE) = P (A|XE). (4)
With that in place, Condition 1 becomes formally the following:
Condition 1 (reformulated). If P (A|XE) = P (A|X), P (A|F ) = P (A)→ P (A|FXE) =
P (A|XE), and the Principal Principle P (A|X) = x holds, then P (A|FXE) = P (A|X).
Formula (4) is indeed weaker than the Authors’ screening off condition, as evidenced by
the following Counterexample (which—we claim—falsifies also the original Conditions 1 and
2):
Counterexample 1 Let L be the Boolean algebra generated by the logically independent
propositions A,E, F ,2 and X = “Ch(A) = 2/5” and let P be the probability on L that
assigns 1/10 to the propositions ¬X¬A¬E¬F , ¬X¬AE¬F , X¬A¬E¬F , X¬AE¬F , and
2And so F can be assumed not to be “logically complex”, as the Authors wish.
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assigns 1/20 to the rest of the algebraic atoms. (L, P ) then has the following properties:
2
5
= P (A|XE) = P (A|X) = 2
5
(5)
1
2
= P (A|F ) 6= P (A) = 2
5
(6)
1
2
= P (A|FXE) 6= P (A|XE) = 2
5
(7)
1
2
= P (A|FXE) 6= P (A|X) = 2
5
(8)
2
5
= P (F ) = P (F |XE) = 2
5
(9)
1
3
= P (A|XE(A↔ F )) 6= P (A|X) = 2
5
(10)
(i) Due to (5),(6), and (9) (L, P ) is a counterexample to
P (A|XE) = P (A|X) = x
P (A|F ) = P (A)→ P (A|FXE) = P (A|XE)
P (A|FXE) = P (A|X) = x,
that is, to the reformulated Condition 1 (see below)
(ii) Due to (5),(6),(7), and (8) (L, P ) is a counterexample to Condition 1. (On the as-
sumption that from the fact that due to (6) and (7) we see that conditioning on XE
leaves both the probability of A and the probability of F intact we can infer that “XE
contains no information that renders F relevant to A”.)
(iii) Due to (5),(9), and (10) (L, P ) is a counterexample to Condition 2.
The interpretation of the propositions involved has to matter since the Authors only
provide a single intuition boosting example to illustrate the reasonableness of Condition
1, and the plausibility of their illustration rests on a proper reading of what it is for a
characterization of a situation to not contain information that renders two events relevant
to each other. Apart from this sole example the Authors do not provide any philosophical
analysis of the plausibility of Condition 1, because they claim, with their Proposition 1, that
Condition 1 “provably holds.” However, it holds only if “containing no information that
renders F relevant to A” is expressed as “screening off F from A”; our Counterexample also
shows that it does not hold if we follow the formulation of the condition more accurately,
for example by using (4).
There are of course other formal candidates for “XE containing no information that
renders F relevant to A” which could be considered, of various logical strength. One which
perhaps could be promising is P (A|F ) − P (A) = P (A|FXE) − P (A|XE). However, if we
use that in Condition 1, it agains falls prey to our Counterexample 1—as evidenced by the
clause (ii). The situation is similar with all other candidates we have explored.
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Since their Proposition 1 is no proof of Condition 1 as reconstructed above, the Authors
would need to provide a philosophical justification for it. But since the justification for Con-
dition 2 also depends on the availability of justification of Condition 1—the Authors counter
one of the main objections against Condition 2, namely that it fails under a definition of
admissibility put forward by Meacham (2010), by claiming that that Meacham’s admissi-
bility is too restrictive is evidenced by the fact that it entails a violation of the supposedly
provable Condition 1—the premises of the main Proposition 2 stay insufficiently motivated,
which then carries over to whatever conclusion one can draw from it.
To wager philosophical bets on the potential success of justification of Condition 1 and
Condition 2 we remark that our Counterexample also evidences a probability space in which
both of these conditions fail. Universal quantification (or at least the existence of a sound
argument for typicality) over events and spaces matters since the mere fact that some events
in some probability spaces have a probability 1/2 would not establish a connection between
the Principal Principle and the Principle of Indifference.
We emphasize that our remarks regarding the appropriate formal reconstruction of the
Authors’ verbal formulation of Condition 1 is independent from the argument developed in
the main text.
As for some further remarks regarding Condition 2, we note that the flavor “under some
conditions, since we are ignorant of whether an independence constraint holds, we assume
that it does” it possesses is similar to “under some conditions, since we are ignorant of the
probability, we assume that it is 1/2”—which is the Principle of Indifference. This raises the
suspicion that we are proving what we already put in; indeed a requirement of probabilistic
independence is of comparable strength as narrowing down the probability to a single value,
as we are now going to illustrate.
Thus let us consider now the Authors’ inference from P (F |XE) = 1/2 to P (F ) =
1/2 right after their Proposition 2, which is the basis for their philosophical claim that
the Principle of Indifference should also hold for the unconditional prior. It should be
clear that this inference is only valid if Condition 2 indeed holds, but the assumptions of
their Proposition 2 can hold without Condition 2 being true (or, alternatively, assumptions
of Proposition 2’ can hold without Condition 2’ being true). One can also quantify how
frequently this is the case. Let us assume that (LX , PX) satisfies the conditions of our
Proposition 2’ and hence PX(F |E) = 1/2. Using the terminology of the proof of Proposition
2’, let L be generated by adding an additional algebraic atom o0 to LX , let A,E, F be the
same as in the proof and let X = {o1, ..., o8}; then with the probability P (Y ) = p0 ·χY (o0) +
(1−p0)·PX(Y X) the new (L, P ) also satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2’ and P (Y |X) =
PX(Y ). It is then easy to show that P (F ) = 1/2 only when p0 = 1−1/(2(p2 +p4 +p6 +p8)).
Thus even though in all of the so-defined extensions P (F |EX) = 1/2, there is only one in
which P (F ) = 1/2 (and thus in which the independence constraint P (F ) = P (F |XE) holds)
while in all of the uncountably many others P (F ) 6= 1/2. Loosely speaking it appears, then,
that in this case we should expect Condition 2 to hold only as frequently as we would expect
P (F ) = 1/2 to hold if we set its value randomly.
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